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Broken Promises: the case of Mothers of Srebrenica vs. The State of the Netherlands  
 On July 16th, 2014, BBC news published a story with the title "Dutch State Liable over 
300 Srebrenica Deaths." Almost twenty years after the genocide at Srebrenica, the Dutch State 
acknowledged, to a small extent, their role in the massacre. This verdict was the result of eight 
years of appeals in the Dutch courts for the organization Mothers of Srebrenica, an NGO that 
represents the interests of survivors of the genocide.  Though they had originally hoped for a 
much wider acknowledgment of the role of the Dutch UN peacekeepers, the Dutch Courts ruled 
that the peacekeepers were guilty of not doing more to protect the refugees they sheltered in their 
compound during the assault on Srebrenica.1 This small victory was hard won, and a closer 
examination of the court documents reveals why. The structure and content of the court case, 
from evidence brought by the UN to the testimonies of the survivors reflects the power structures 
that the Mothers of Srebrenica took on in this court case. Further, the actions of the UN and the 
Dutch government, as revealed in court documents, tells about the ambiguous role and 
responsibility of the UN on the international stage.  
 
 
                                                          




The Bosnian genocide, in particular the massacre at Srebrenica is considered to be one of 
(if not the) greatest atrocity in Europe since World War II. In the months leading up to the July 
1995 massacre, the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in Bosnia had taken up the 
strategy of creating "safe areas" at several enclaves in Western Bosnia. Srebrenica became one of 
these "safe areas." Though the Serb army had taken a great deal of territory in what is today the 
Republika Srpska, or the predominantly Serb entity within Bosnia, there remained several key 
towns or "enclaves" that were predominantly composed of Bosnian Muslims, or Bošniaks. Once 
the "safe areas" were established, they were flooded with Bošniak refugees. Meanwhile, Serb 
forces cut off supply routes and the humanitarian situation in many of these supposedly safe 
towns quickly deteriorated.2   
The UNPROFOR forces at Srebrenica consisted of the Dutchbat, or Dutch battalion, 
which consisted of approximately four hundred "lightly armed" peacekeepers. Following a brief 
period of demilitarization, on July 6th, 1995, Serb forces returned and began to encroach on the 
enclave. The Serb forces were led primarily by Ratko Mladic, whose trial for genocide and other 
war crimes is currently ongoing at the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia 
(ICTY).3 Despite repeated requests from the Dutchbat for reinforcements or air support, the 
enclave was quickly overrun and the Dutchbat and many of the refugees in the enclave fled to 
the Dutchbat's compound in the neighboring village of Potočari.  A group of men who did not 
attempt to take shelter at Potočari fled into the woods surrounding the enclave, but were later 
captured and executed by the Serbs.  At the compound the humanitarian situation further 
                                                          
2 Haguejusticeportal.net,. 2015. 'Srebrenica In Summary » The Hague Justice Portal'. 
http://www.haguejusticeportal.net/index.php?id=9564. 
3 General Krstič and Radovan Karadzic are also being tried for genocide and other war crimes related to Srebrenica 
at the ICTY.  
collapsed. The Serb forces eventually reached the compound, and without any hope of support or 
the Dutchbat turned over the compound to Mladic. From the refugees present in an around the 
compound, women and children were crowded onto busses and "deported" to Bošniak territory 
in an act of ethnic cleansing. This deportation took several days, and in the intervening period 
many were raped, tortured, or otherwise harassed. Men of "fighting age" (anyone from teenage 
boys to elderly men) were detained by Mladic's forces on the pretense of screening the men for 
"war crimes." They were instead stripped of any sort of identification, executed en masse and 
buried in mass graves.4  At the time of my visit to the Potočari memorial cemetery in 2013, the 
remains of approximately 6,000 Bosnian men had been identified and re-buried there. Most 
estimates place the number dead at 8,000, though the court proceedings from the Mothers of 
Srebrenica case consistently use 7,0005. Some estimates run as high as 10,000.6   
The massacre at Srebrenica was officially ruled a genocide by the ICTY in 2004.7 The 
Mothers of Srebrenica, an NGO representing the interests of survivors of Srebrenica, first 
brought their case to the Netherlands in 2007, with the first judgement given in 2008.8 This 
organization operates both in Bosnia and the Netherlands, where there is incidentally a 
significant Bosnian refugee community. They brought their case both against the Dutch 
government and the United Nations, and their case was dismissed on several appeals due to lack 
of jurisdiction over the UN, which enjoys absolute immunity. Their case was appealed up to the 
supreme court of the Netherlands, where they succeeded in a small but significant piece of their 
case. The Dutch government acknowledged the culpability of the Dutchbat in assisting with the 
                                                          
4 Mothers of Srebrenica vs. the State of the Netherlands and the United Nations, C/09/295247/  
HA ZA 07 – 2973 (District Court in The Hague – 2014), Rechtspraak.nl 
5 Ibid. 
6 Personal communication, April 2013 
7 Haguejusticeportal.net, Op.cit. 
8 Mothers of Srebrenica vs. the State of the Netherlands and the United Nations (Judgment)  
295247/ HA ZA 07 – 2973 (District Court in the Hague– 2008)  
deportation of the refugees and not acting differently even though they could have reasonably 
expected that genocide may take place. However, the Dutch government only acknowledged 
responsibility for the approximately 300 men who were sheltered inside the Dutch compound – 
those refugees over which they had "effective control" - but later were turned over to the Serb 
forces. Formal recognition of this was given and small reparations were paid to the families of 
those 300 men.9  
Positionality 
 I would be remiss if I did not acknowledge my personal interest in the Mothers of 
Srebrenica case. I studied abroad in Serbia and Bosnia in the spring of 2013, and during that time 
visited both the Potočari compound and the memorial cemetery, and had the opportunity to speak 
with those who maintain the memorial. I also during that time did research in North East Bosnia, 
not far from the Federation/Republika Srpska border, an area that had also suffered heavily 
during the war. On the edge of the town where I did my research was a facility for the 
identification of bodies found in mass graves, and only a few months after my departure from 
Bosnia, the largest mass grave ever found was discovered only a few towns over. Between the 
ongoing attempts to identify victims and the ongoing trials in The Hague, the war is still a very 
present piece of Bosnian life and society.  
 Though I have done my best to remain analytical in discussing the Mothers of Srebrenica 
case, I nevertheless maintain my own opinions and feelings on how the attempts to deal with the 
genocide have played out on an international scale. This is a topic that it is impossible to not 
become emotionally involved in, particularly when one has friends and colleagues who could be 
                                                          
9 Mothers of Srebrenica 2014, op. cit.  
potentially affected by the outcomes of these kinds of cases. However, I feel that my time in 
Bosnia has also had a positive influence on this research in that I have a greater understanding of 
the multiple "sides" involved – or rather that this court case is far more complicated than picking 
a "side."  
Legal Structures and Power Relations 
 Examining a court case entails a specific framework and its own set of specific 
discourses. First, one must contend with the form of the available materials. My research focuses 
primarily on the 2014 proceedings, the final appeal of the Mothers of Srebrenica court case that 
produced the ruling on the culpability of the Dutchbat. As mentioned, there were three prior 
rulings, in 200810, 201011, and 201212, but these all resulted in the case being dismissed based on 
the immunity of the United Nations.  In general, the materials published from these cases are 
structured first with the facts of the case, the claims and desired outcome from each side, a 
discussion of testimony and information brought forward during the court proceedings, and 
finally the judgement. The materials from the 2014 case are the most involved, as actual court 
proceedings were dismissed relatively quickly in the previous cases. It should be noted that I am 
working with the English translation of these materials, the official and original court 
proceedings are in Dutch, however English is used widely in the Netherlands and I consider this 
to be a fairly accurate translation. Nonetheless, it is important to keep this in mind.13  
                                                          
10 Mothers of Srebrenica 2008, op. cit.  
11 Mothers of Srebrenica vs. the State of the Netherlands and the United Nations (Judgment), 200.022.151/01 / HA 
ZA 07 - 2973 (Appeal Court in The Hague – 2010), rechtspraak.nl 
12 Mothers of Srebrenica vs. the State of the Netherlands and the United Nations (Judgment) 10/04437 (Supreme 
Court of the Netherlands – 2012), rechtspraak.nl 
13 Mothers of Srebrenica 2014, op.cit. 
Much of my analysis comes from the section titled the "facts of the case." It is important 
here to deconstruct the set of assumptions that are made within the context of a legal setting.  
The assumption within this particular structure of establishing "the facts of the case" is that there 
are certain facts, or rather truths that can be unequivocally stated. Further it is important to 
examine what is deemed unquestionably factual by the courts. 
 The facts of the case in the 2014 proceedings detail the events leading up the genocide at 
Srebrenica, including records of communications between the Dutchbat and their superiors at 
UNPROFOR, as well as excerpts from resolutions about the situation made by the UN Security 
Council. Some of this information appears to come from facts established by ICTY proceedings, 
and utilized here. After approximately five pages of this information, the facts that can be 
established from each member of the Mothers of Srebrenica directly involved in the case (the 10 
"claimants") is listed. The facts pertaining to each of the ten claimants takes up approximately a 
page and a half. After the great amount of detail given to the official "story" of the events at 
Srebrenica, the sections devoted to the claimants is striking: 
"Before the war Claimant [Claimant1] lived with her husband and son in the town of 
Srebrenica. On July 11th 1995 the husband of [Claimant1] fled into the woods and was 
never found again. [Claimant 1] and her son sought refuge in the part of the mini safe 
area that lay outside the compound. On July 13th 1995 she and her son became separated. 
She has not seen him again since."14 
This is the first Claimant's "facts" in their entirety. While given the prior information one can 
infer that both Claimant 1's son and husband were killed by the Serb forces, this is not written 
                                                          
14 Ibid., 2.45.1 
here, as that could be deemed speculation. They do not even go so far as to note whether or not 
they are assumed to be deceased. Further, one call also infer that she was part of the 
"deportation" from Srebrenica, and that it was during this process that she and her son were 
separated, but this is not detailed. Her story, and the stories of the other claimants, has been 
stripped down past its most essential elements.  
 While of course one must take into account that what is being examined in this case are 
the actions of the Dutchbat and the Dutch government, the literal amount of space given to the 
"official story" versus the personal experiences of the claimants represents the power imbalance 
between an independent organization composed primarily of women, versus large, male-
dominated government and international structures. The documentation and records of these 
"official structures" are first and foremost deemed more factual and therefore more valued than 
the personal experiences of the mothers of Srebrenica women. Second, though it is indeed a 
quirk of legal language, the women are referred to as "claimants." While this supports the kind of 
neutrality that legal negotiations aim for, in that it does not acknowledge the women's claims as 
true until fully examined by the court, it subtly undermines their position. This inequality, 
particularly in reference to the claims made against the UN, is even mentioned in the argument 
made by the Mothers of Srebrenica's legal team:  
"Claimants argue that the States adopted course of action during the proceedings was 
'improper' and 'from a legal, humane and moral point of view unacceptable". In their view 
this has led to the legal proceedings having a lack of equilibrium that must be restored."15 
                                                          
15 Ibid., 4.17 
The improper course of action here being the multiple dismissals of the case based on the 
decisions regarding lack of jurisdiction and the immunity of the UN, rather than addressing the 
claims of the case itself. The Mothers of Srebrenica's initial claim against the UN and its 
reasoning in trying to overcome the UN's immunity is based on the European Convention on 
Human Right's statute that gives all individuals right to access to a court.16 Further, much of the 
Mothers of Srebrenica's argument lies in their appeal to a moral sense of right and wrong, as 
opposed to a strict interpretation of existing legal structures. Based on several precedents, the 
Dutchbat and the Dutch government apparatuses behind it could claim immunity based on the 
idea that it acted as an "organ" of the UN.17 18Therefore much of the language surrounding the 
Mothers of Srebrenica's claims and legal arguments carry an air of moral outrage and an acute 
sense of their powerlessness in the context of international law.  
 This powerlessness is further exacerbated by the use of the term "refugee." All the 
occupants of Srebrenica at the time of the genocide are referred to throughout the court 
documents as refugees. The court does acknowledges that it uses  
"the term 'refugee' to indicate the members of the Muslim population who found 
themselves in the safe area…In doing so the District Court makes no judgment as to 
whether they are refugees in the sense in which that is understood by the Geneva 
Convention on Refugees."19 
                                                          
16 Faith, Kimberly. 2015. 'Stichting Mothers Of Srebrenica V. Netherlands: Does U.N. Immunity Trump The Right Of 
Access To A Court?'. Tulane Journal Of International And Comparative Law 22. 
17 See Behrami v. France and Saramati v. France  
18 Spijkers, Otto. 2014. 'Responsibility Of The Netherlands For The Genocide In Srebrenica'.Journal Of 
International Peacekeeping 18 (3-4): 281-289.doi:10.1163/18754112-1804009. 
19 Mothers of Srebrenica 2014, op. cit. 4.14 
Indeed a more accurate term may be internally displaced persons, regardless, the term 
implies people that are not – or can't be – where they are supposed to be. While it is, in most 
cases an important term that can assist individuals when seeking support or aid, that is not the 
case here. It is used as a point of further marginalizing the Mothers of Srebrenica group by 
placing them under a label that is not necessarily accurate. Indeed it is noted in the court 
proceedings that the majority of the claimants were residents of Srebrenica or the surrounding 
villages at the time that the "safe area" was established, if not prior to the war.  While it is 
uncertain whether or not the majority of Srebrenica's occupants at the time of the massacre were 
original residents, the exclusive use of the word refugee erases the existence and history of the 
town prior to and outside the context of conflict.  It minimizes the dual nature of the ethnic 
cleansing that occurred, in that not only were people seeking safety further displaced, but that 
residents were forcibly removed from their home town.   In the 2014 case, the Dutch government 
acknowledged culpability exclusively for cooperating in the deportation of "refugees" – this 
could have been a very different legal conversation if it had been acknowledged that they 
assisted in the deportations of residents as well as refugees.  
Key Terms 
 By the very nature of this case, it contains a variety of contested language. Both the 
Mothers of Srebrenica and the Dutch agree on the general nature of the events as Srebrenica, 
particularly due to the fact that this case comes after several key cases at the ICTY.  However, as 
shown above, the language used by each side, down to the choices of single words, represents 
some key underlying issues. 
 The most obvious of these is how the events at Srebrenica are referred to in and of 
themselves. Throughout the court proceedings, it is referred to consistently as "The fall of 
Srebrenica." While at first this phrasing appeals to the neutrality of the court setting, it is 
important to note that at the time the case was first brought to the Dutch court in 2007, the events 
at Srebrenica had already been ruled a genocide by the ICTY.20  Therefore referring to the events 
as "the fall of Srebrenica" is interesting and perhaps contentious. Common phrasings include "the 
Srebrenica massacre," "The Srebrenica genocide" or "The genocide at Srebrenica"21 or simply 
"Srebrenica" as it has become more well-known. The use of the phrase "the fall of Srebrenica" 
therefore creates a distancing and minimizing effect, where as many other common phrases 
emphasize the tragedy and gravity of the event. Further, the use of this phrase is part of a larger 
theme of distancing from the language of the Dutch government. Indeed the use of the word 
"fall" implies a certain element of inevitability that permeates the language of the UN and the 
Dutch government. This sense of inevitability is a tactic in distancing them from any sort of 
culpability – a sense of "there was nothing we could do." 
In contrast to the stark, emotionally charged language used by the Mothers of Srebrenica 
and their legal counsel, the language used by the Dutch court and government, as well as that 
language cited from the UN, gives a sense of being disconnected from the events that are being 
discussed. Indeed, much of this reflects physical distance, as decisions from the UN about the 
actions of the Dutchbat were being made remotely, as well as temporal distance, as these court 
proceedings occurred almost two decades after the massacre at Srebrenica. This is in stark 
contrast to the nearness of traumatic events for the survivors.  
                                                          
20 Costalli, Stefano. 2013. 'Does Peacekeeping Work? A Disaggregated Analysis Of Deployment And Violence 
Reduction In The Bosnian War'. Brit. J. Polit. Sci. 44 (02): 357-380. doi:10.1017/s0007123412000634. 
21 "Genocid u Srebrenici" in Bosnian 
 This distancing theme is further reflected in the phrase "fell into Bosnian Serb hands." 
This phrasing is used consistently to refer to the men that fled not to the Potočari compound but 
into the woods: 
"Around 10,000 to 15,000 men from the safe area did not flee to the mini safe area with 
factory but to the woods in the vicinity of the town of Srebrenica…About 6,000 of these 
men fell into Bosnian Serb hands."22 
It should be noted that there are some accounts that members of the Dutchbat advised groups of 
men to flee into the woods. What is fascinating in the case of this particular phrase is the 
obscuring of the consequences of "falling" into enemy hands. While of course the fate of certain 
men is still uncertain, the deaths of a large number of men who fled into the woods are not 
explicitly acknowledged. Moreover the use of the word "fell" is interesting – it appears to imply 
that being captured by Serb forces was somehow a result of the men making a misstep or 
stumbling of their own accord, rather than being hunted down and rounded up by Serb forces.23  
In many ways the choice of this phrase serves to subtly shift blame both away from the Dutchbat 
and the even the Serb forces.  
 Another highly contentious and significant phrase that is, by necessity, used throughout 
the court documents is "safe area." While the term "enclave" is sometimes used, "safe area," 
despite its inaccuracy, is almost always used, and no alternative phrase has been proposed or 
utilized.  The term is even extended into the phrase "mini safe area," which is used to refer to the 
Potočari compound and the abandoned factory where the refugees fled after Srebrenica was 
overrun by the Serb forces. "Safe area" is either written between scare quotes or italicized 
                                                          
22 Mother of Srebrenica 2014, op. cit. 2.36 
23 A Cry From The Grave. 1999.  DVD. Bosnia: Leslie Woodhead. 
throughout the court documents, in an interesting contrast to the distancing language mentioned 
above.24 The use of quotes is a method of acknowledging the irony and inaccuracy of the term. 
While this is acknowledged, the lack of an alternative term is also a consist reminder of the 
original (good) intentions of the Dutchbat and the UNPROFOR mission in Bosnia.   
Broken Promises 
 The court materials, particularly the "facts of the case" section, document a great deal of 
UN resolutions and other communications related to Srebrenica. The UN, or representatives 
thereof, make a few key promises that were obviously not met. A few months prior to the 
Srebrenica massacre, the then commander of UNPROFOR, the French general Morillon 
"addressed a crowd of Bosnian Muslims in Srebrenica and promised them that they were under 
the protection of the UN and that he would not abandon them."25 This promise was "reaffirmed" 
through April and June through a series of Security Council resolutions related to the "safe 
areas" in Bosnia. Resolution 819 stated that the UN "demands that all parties and others 
concerned treat Srebrenica and its surroundings as a safe area which should be free from any 
armed attack or other hostile act…" and Resolution 836 states that the Security council 
"decid[ed] to ensure full respect for the safe areas referred to…"26 While these promises were 
obviously not kept, they were also rather transparent in that the force placed at Srebrenica was 
woefully unprepared to fulfill these promises. Additionally, they become part of the 
contradictory nature of the UN communications and directives.  
The UN and Dutch leadership frequently uses a mix of distancing or tentative language 
with strong promises, often in the same sentence. For example, in Resolution 836 as mentioned 
                                                          
24 Mothers of Srebrenica 2014, op. cit. 
25 Ibid., 2.6 
26 Ibid., 2.12 
about, the mandate of the UNPROFOR is extended to "enable" the protection of the safe areas, 
"deter attacks…monitor the cease fire, and to promote the withdrawal of paramilitary units…"27  
Deter, monitor, and promote all suggest a certain degree of detachment from the conflict, 
perhaps rightly so. The UN seems to be clearly outlining UNPROFOR's role as an outside 
mediator, not a direct actor in the conflict. This language is also intentionally vague, denoting the 
distance between the Security Council's decision making and the troops on the ground.  
However, in the same resolution, "the use of force" and "all necessary measures"28 are 
authorized.  The UN's language carefully toes the line of national sovereignty, but their language 
also reflects the confusion inherent in where national sovereignty falls, particularly in the case of 
a state becoming several states through violent conflict.   
Assigning Blame and Negotiating Immunity 
 The Convention of the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations, officially 
adopted in 1946 states that  
"The United Nations, its property and assets wherever located and by whomsoever held, 
shall enjoy immunity from every form of legal process except insofar as in any particular 
case it has expressly waived its immunity shall extend to any particular case it has 
expressly waived its immunity."29 
This is an extension and extrapolation of Articles 104 and 105 of the Charter of the United 
Nations. Further, under Article V111, Settlements of Disputes, this Convention states that "The 
                                                          
27 Ibid., 2.12 
28 Ibid., 2.12 
29 UN General Assembly, “Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations,”  
Feb. 13, 1946, http://www.un.org/en/ethics/pdf/convention.pdf  
United Nations shall make provisions for appropriate modes of settlement."30 Thus far the 
"appropriate modes of settlement" have only been applied to internal disputes within the UN. 
Though summoned to the Dutch courts throughout the appeals process, the UN is always marked 
in the court documents as simply "failing to appear."31 Particularly in this case, the UN has 
interpreted this immunity to mean only engaging with those who object to its actions on its own 
terms. Though I have not conducted an exhaustive search, I was not able to find any example of 
the UN waving its immunity on an international scale.  
Though the UN has refused to engage in the Mothers of Srebrenica case, they have 
publically acknowledged the Srebrenica massacre in a press release:  
"The United Nations experience in Bosnia was one of the most difficult and painful in 
our history. It is with the deepest regret and remorse that we have reviewed our own 
actions and decisions in the face of the assault on Srebrenica. Through error, 
misjudgment and an inability to recognize the scope of the evil confronting us, we failed 
to do our part to help save the people of Srebrenica from the Serb campaign of mass 
murder…The tragedy of Srebrenica will haunt our history forever." (Emphasis mine)32 
The use of the pronoun "our" is very interesting here – while it may have been intended to 
universalize the feeling of "remorse" or grief on behalf of the Bosnian people, it instead serves to 
re-center the conversation from the suffering of the Bosnian people to the difficulties faced by 
those in the UN who made the "error" and "failed to do [their] part."  The use of the word "evil" 
is also significant – it is a complete othering and caricaturing of the Serbs, one which erases the 
fact that Serbs and Bošniaks lived peacefully together for many years under Yugoslavia. While 
                                                          
30 Ibid. 
31 Mothers of Srebrenica 2008,2010,2012,2014, op. cit.  
32 Faith, op. cit., p. 4 
the word "evil" is certainly deserved by many Serbian war criminals, it is important to discuss 
that the blanket blame placed on the Serbs is part of an international discourse that has attempted 
to simplify narratives about the conflict in Bosnia. Much of the international discourse emerging 
out of the ICTY unequivocally places "blame" on the Bosnia Serb forces, and by extension the 
Serbian government for the conflict. The international narrative, as opposed to the multiple 
narratives maintained within Bosnia, clearly outlines "aggressors" or "perpetrators" and victims. 
Further, by placing the UN in direct conflict to "evil" it implicitly reasserts the UN as "good."  
 A very similar statement is made in the court proceedings, this time emanating from the 
Dutch government: 
"The State sticks to its position emphasizing the fact that the fall of Srebrenica and the 
many dead is a matter of regret and constitutes a "black page" in the history of Europe 
and that the international community did not succeed in preventing this drama from 
playing out. Moreover the state points out that it was the Bosnian Serbs who were 
responsible for committing the genocide. The District Court notes that nevertheless in 
this regard if unlawful acts did take place that are attributable to the State it may be held 
liable."33 
In both of these "acknowledgments" or perhaps "apologies" both the Dutch State and the UN 
intentionally distance themselves from the violence that occurred. Indeed the state is correct in 
stating that it did not commit genocide, but the emphasis is placed on the actions of the Serbs 
over the promises that it made and broke. Similar to the equivocation in the promises and 
resolutions leading up to Srebrenica, it maintains its role as a force outside of the conflict when 
                                                          
33 Mothers of Srebrenica., op. cit., 4.13 
convenient and minimizes its active involvement. This statement from the Dutch State even goes 
so far as to minimize the violence of the Srebrenica massacre by referring to it indirectly as a 
"drama" that "played out." Further the use of the phrase "played out" implies a certain 
inevitability, further absolving the international presence of its role in the massacre.  
Conclusion 
 It is difficult to say whether or not the Mothers of Srebrenica knew what they were taking 
on when they decided to sue the UN and the Dutch government. They were taking on two 
entities that, while holding a great deal of power, are also often unsure of how exactly to use that 
power. For the UN in particular, the ambiguity of its role in international conflict is displayed 
through contradictory and vague language, couched in goals that look surprisingly like promises. 
The Dutch government as well wavers between its particular role and the desire to push blame 
towards the UN. Both of these entities, though never directly denying their role, subtly push 
blame away from themselves. When set in contrast to the direct and emotionally charged 
language of the Mothers of Srebrenica, this equivocal language points to the power structures 
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